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It is difficult to find decisive criteria by which to distinguish norms from values. In 
this article I argue that if we assume that norms essentially possess a specific set of 
properties, and that values do not possess these properties, we can better appreciate the 
distinction between norms and values and explain the plausibility of other traditional 
criteria of distinction. The relevant properties are that norms are directed to some 
addressees, possess conditions of satisfaction and are supposed to guide and motivate 
their addressees to satisfy these conditions.  
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one of the most general distinctions in the normative domain is that 
between norms and values.1 Paradigmatic types of norms are duties, 
directives, moral norms, positive laws, rules regulating specific 
practices like games, reasoning and language, rules of etiquette and 
customs. instances of values are goodness, intelligence, courage, 
injustice, inefficacy and awfulness.2 although the distinction between 
these two domains looks prima facie intuitive, it is difficult to find 
clear and decisive criteria by which to distinguish norms from values. 
Philosophers have tried to individuate properties distinctive of each 
domain. however, there is disagreement about whether the suggested 
criteria can provide sufficient conditions to individuate and distinguish 
each domain from the other. furthermore, even the apparently most 
plausible criteria of distinction rely on features which seem to be 
derivative from some further more fundamental properties of norms or 
values.3
in this article, i argue that if we assume that norms essentially possess 
a specific set of properties, and that values do not possess these same 
properties, we can individuate more stable grounds for the distinction and 
provide an explanation of the plausibility of the criteria traditionally used by 
philosophers to track the distinction. The relevant properties constitutive of 
norms are that norms are directed to some addressees, possess conditions of 
satisfaction, and are supposed to guide and motivate their addresses to satisfy 
these conditions and to do it in the appropriate way. 
1 according to a different terminology, norms are called “deontic norms” and values 
“evaluative norms” or “axiological norms”. a less common terminology calls the formers 
“directives” and the latter “evaluations” or “evaluatives”. for these uses see, for example, 
Wiggins (1998), p. 95 and Thomson (2008).
2  Values may be distinguished as positive or negative (disvalues). i will use here the term 
“value” in a technical sense, designating both values and disvalues. This use diverges from an 
ordinary use of the term according to which values are positive, as opposed to disvalues. see 
Mulligan (2010) for a clarification of the two uses.
3  in this paper i discuss how values and norms should be distinguished. i do not address other 
important issues such as how values and norms are related, what they have in common, and how 
they differ from non-normative entities and properties, such as physical and abstract objects. 
The distinction between the normative and the non-normative domain is often drawn on the 
basis of a distinction between what is and what should/ought to be, or in terms of natural vs. 
non-natural facts (where natural facts are the proper objects of natural sciences or mathematics, 
accountable for in mere descriptive terms). This distinction has been discussed in the analytical 
tradition since David Hume and G.E. Moore (e.g., Moore (1903/1993), p. 92). For an analogous 
discussion in the non-analytical tradition see Husserl (1973) §14. For a recent discussion see also 
Tappolet (2000), pp. 15-16 and Mulligan (2009), p. 405.
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This is the plan of the article: in section 1 i introduce and critically 
discuss the traditional criteria of distinction between norms and values. 
in section 2 i put forward a description of the relevant properties that i 
consider characteristic of norms. in section 3 i show how such properties 
can provide an explanation of the criteria of distinction considered in 
section 1.
in this section i introduce a list of criteria traditionally used in the 
literature to track the distinction between norms and values and provide 
a brief critical discussion of each of them.   
1. lexical differences.4 Values and norms are expressed by distinct 
families of terms. Terms expressing values are linked amongst 
themselves and organized around the general terms “good” and 
“bad”. all evaluative terms are appreciative or depreciative, i.e., 
they qualify an entity in some positive or negative sense. The 
domain of evaluative terms is distinct and independent from that 
including normative terms such as “obligatory”, “permitted” and 
“forbidden”. Terms and expressions of this second lexical family 
are, in their turn, connected by different relations. according to 
a common view, “forbidden”, “permitted” and “obligatory” are 
inter-definable: what is obligatory is not permitted not to do, 
what is forbidden is obligatory not to do, and what is permitted 
is not obligatory not to do.5 another difference concerns the 
respective judgments: judgments about norms can be expressed 
by imperative claims (compare “it is forbidden to trample on the 
grass” and “don’t trample on the grass!”). This is not the case for 
judgments about values.
2. Conceptual richness/poorness.6 evaluative concepts can be 
distinguished as thick or thin.7 Thick concepts, such as goodness 
and badness, are more specific than thin concepts such as 
generosity, honesty and boredom. all thick evaluative concepts 
designate properties that can be considered as varieties of ways 
in which a thing or a person may be good or bad. The relations 
4  Ogien e Tappolet (2009), pp. 40-44. See also Smith (2005), pp. 11-12 for a similar distinction.
5  The interdefinability of these three notions has been the target of some criticisms. In 
particular it has been argued that permissions cannot be defined in terms of the other two 
concepts. See, for example, Von Wright 1963, pp. 83-87.
6  Mulligan (1998); Mulligan (2009),Ogien e Tappolet (2009)
7  See, for example, Mulligan (1998), p. 162, Mulligan (2009), pp. 401-402 and 409-410, Tappolet 
(2000), pp. 14 and 20-23. The distinction between thick and thin values is due to Bernard 
williams; see, e.g., williams (1985), p. 128.
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amongst norms are less complex than those exhibited among 
values. in a way, norms also admit specifications. norms can be 
distinguished in sub-species such as moral, cognitive, aesthetic, 
technical, prudential, economic, and so on. an action can be 
legally permitted or permitted according to some specific legal 
code, and so on. however there is an asymmetry between the 
specificity of thick evaluative concepts and that of norms. while 
thick evaluative concepts are different concepts from the thin 
evaluative ones that they specify (goodness is different from 
generosity; one can be evil but generous), more specified norms 
do not designate independent normative concepts, they are 
specifications of normative standards they are relative to (what 
is legally permitted is what the law permits, it is an instance of 
permission relative to a specific standard).
3. Psychological distinctions.8 Values seem to be related to 
affective and emotional states.9 for example, admirability and 
shamefulness are connected to the emotions of admiration 
and shame. There is a conceptual dependence between many 
evaluative predicates and predicates of emotional states (e.g., 
boring and being bored, amusing and being amused, annoying 
and being annoyed). norms don’t entertain so strict a relation 
with emotions. The notions of obligatoriness and permission 
do not have corresponding notions in the domain of emotional 
states. it has been argued that norms have more affinities 
with desires insofar as, contrary to emotions and similarly 
to desires, they tend to directly motivate agents. This doesn’t 
seem completely correct. norms clearly entertain a special 
relation with motivation that values do not. however there is an 
important difference between the motivational force of desires 
and that of norms. even if norms are always supposed to motivate 
their addressees to act as they require, they may fail to be 
regarded by agents as sources of motivation.
4. Syntactical differences.10 a standard view is that judgments 
expressing norms often possess a logical form involving operators 
which take propositions or predicates (e.g., “it is forbidden 
[to trample on the grass]”, “it is obligatory that [drivers stop 
8  Wiggins (1987), Mulligan (1998), Skorupski (1999), Tappolet (2000), Hansson (2001), Ogien e 
Tappolet (2009), pp. 49-52.
9  a precursor of the idea that a strict relation obtains between values and emotions was 
scheler (1973).
10  Ogien e Tappolet (2009) pp. 52-60.
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when the light is red]”).11 on the contrary, normally evaluative 
concepts figure in judgments in a predicative position. consider, 
for example, “the conduct of John is admirable” or “the film 
was boring”. however, such a criterion of distinction is not so 
straightforward. sometimes also normative concepts figure 
in judgments as predicates of actions or agents, as is the 
case in “smoking is forbidden” or “trampling on the grass is 
illegal”.12 conversely, sometimes evaluative judgments involve 
propositional operators, as in “it would be good that [there were 
no earthquakes]”.
5. gradability.13 gradability is a distinctive feature of values. 
Things can be more or less good, interesting or ugly. This is not 
the case for norms: there are no more or less permitted, forbidden 
or obligatory actions. noteworthy exceptions to the rule are 
recommendations and advices, which seem normative but prima 
facie gradable. it could be argued that there actually are degrees 
of obligation and permission in so far as various normative 
standards seem to be ranked in a hierarchical order. for example, 
it is more important to satisfy laws than rules of etiquette, and an 
infraction of the latter is more excusable than one of the former. 
however, such a ranking should not be interpreted as a relation of 
degrees of obligatoriness amongst norms. rather, it constitutes a 
relation of priority or importance. That the law not to kill is more 
important than that requiring one not to cross the street outside 
of the white stripes does not mean that the former action is ‘more 
forbidden’ than the latter.14
6. domain.15 Values range on every sort of entity (objects, 
actions, properties, states of affairs) while norms seem to bear  
11  Wedgwood (2007) pp. 89-99, Ogien e Tappolet (2009) p. 52.
12  See Geach (1982) and Ogien e Tappolet (2009) pp. 53-54.
13  Mulligan (1998) p. 162, Ogien e Tappolet (2009) pp. 60-66.
14  For such considerations see Ogien e Tappolet (2009), pp. 61-62 and Hansson (2001), Ch. 
10. There seem to be three ways in which norms can be ranked: 1) norms can be the object of 
evaluations. different norms can be ranked as more or less evaluable than others. This, i think, 
is the case in the example described above where two exemplified actions are both forbidden 
and the ranking depends on an order of evaluation; one evaluates the norm not to kill as more 
important than the one not to cross the street outside of the white stripes. 2) some norms can 
be hypothetical on some other infringement of a norm. for example, a norm can forbid crossing 
outside of the white stripes, and a second norm can prescribe that, if one breaks this norm, 
then one ought to pay attention that there are no cars coming. 3) The authorities promulgating 
different norms can have different force. Therefore, different normative systems will not be on 
the same level, in the sense that their normative force is different and can be ranked on a scale. 
any of the ways of ranking norms considered here support norm-gradability.
15  VonWright (1963); VonWright (1963), Ogien e Tappolet (2009) pp. 64-72.  
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uniquely on actions. If this were true, it would explain the fact 
that values, but not norms, admit degrees. in fact action has a 
binary nature: we either perform or do not perform an action. 
either we maintain a promise or not. however, here some 
important qualifications are needed. One should distinguish 
between the content of a norm and the way in which a norm is 
complied with. Contents of norms are what norms require, permit 
or forbid. such contents are not only constituted by actions. 
They can also be states of affairs. The norm requiring that ‘ways 
of access have to be open’ is directed to agents, but it does not 
mention any action in its content. however, an agent can comply 
with a norm only by performing some action, by bringing about 
that the state of affairs described by the content of the norm is 
the case.16 
7. Principles regulating norms. norms are committed to 
constraints bearing on the abilities that agents addressed 
by norms are supposed to possess. The most known of these 
constraints is the so-called ought-implies-can principle, according 
to which, if an agent is under some normative commitment, then 
she must be in the position to comply with such a commitment. 
more precisely, she must be in the position of freely choosing 
whether to conform to the norm or to violate it.17 another 
constraint on norms is what Ogien and Tappolet (2009, p. 67) 
call the principle of parsimony, according to which norms bear on 
what is neither necessary nor impossible. norms obliging people 
to breathe or to f ly are absurd and incoherent (if norms at all), 
in so far as they require necessary or impossible things. Values 
are not committed to such principles. we can attribute values 
to things independently of any relation with human agency and 
human capacities, and we can attribute values to necessary and 
16  The way in which an addressee can act to satisfy a norm is also called by some philosophers 
the regulation of the norm. on the distinction between norm and norm-regulation see in 
particular Engel (2007), p. 163 and Engel (2008). On the notion of norm-regulation see also Pollock 
e cruz (1999), ch. 5.
17  This principle has been widely discussed in the literature. see, for example, moore 
(1903/1993), Feldman (1986), VonWright (1963), pp. 108-116, Railton (1999), Darwall (2003), Ogien 
e Tappolet (2009), Mulligan (2009), Glüer e Wikforss (2010). See Von Wright (1963, pp. 108-116) for 
different possible variants of the principle. it has been argued that some ought-claims seem to 
violate this constraint (e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong (1984), Kekes (1984); see Howard-Snyder (2006) 
for a reply). for instance we say that all people in the world ought to have enough food while we 
know very well that it is impossible given the state of the world as it is now. however, it has been 
widely recognized that ought-claims can express both evaluative and normative judgments. if 
this is right, it is plausible to classify the exemplified claims as evaluative assessments for which 
the principle is not in force.
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impossible things. it makes perfect sense to assess as beautiful 
a necessary law of mathematics or wishful the happening of an 
impossible fact.
8. responsibility and blame.18 on the one side, agents may be 
held responsible and blamable for complying or not with a norm; 
on the other side, one cannot be held responsible for being the 
bearer of some value-property. one could object that some values 
allow the attribution of responsibility to agents. an agent can 
be held responsible and blamable for being careless or for not 
being neat. however, in such cases it seems that responsibility 
and blamability depend on further norms requiring things not 
to be in the disvaluable way – in the examples, norms requiring 
the agent to be careful and neat looking. Though someone may be 
a bearer of a value-property and responsible for that, she is not 
responsible qua value-bearer but qua agent committed to some 
norm.  
9. Supervenience.19 Values supervene on natural properties 
of their bearers. for example, an action is altruistic when it 
increases the well-being of others, and a man is careful when he 
pays particular attention to what he does. on the contrary, norms 
do not seem to supervene on natural properties. To this it could 
be objected that, to the extent that norms possess conditions of 
satisfaction that can be described in natural terms, norms also 
supervene on natural properties. for example, the permissibility 
of a move in a chess-game can be considered as supervening on 
a specific movement of a piece. compare “killing is bad” and 
“smoking is forbidden”. in both normative judgments the positive 
assessment or the satisfaction of the norm seems to supervene on 
actions that can be described in natural terms.
although at least some of the listed criteria look prima facie plausible, 
none of them seems to provide sufficient conditions for distinguishing 
norms from values. furthermore, even the criteria that at first sight look 
more plausible lack any explanation of why they seem appropriate. it is a 
legitimate question whether the distinctive features of norms and values 
described by these criteria obtain in virtue of some more fundamental 
properties possessed by either or both of them. if this is the case, the 
individuation of these more fundamental properties would provide a 
18  Smith (2005) pp. 10-13.
19  Mulligan (1998), p. 163.
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more coherent picture of how the features discussed in this section 
relate to each other, and eventually would also provide an explanation of 
these features.   
In the next section (§2) I will suggest that norms essentially possess 
a specific set of features that values do not possess. assuming that 
norms possess such features will help to provide a new rationale for the 
distinction between values and norms and an explanation of the prima 
facie plausibility of the traditional criteria of distinction discussed in 
this section (§3).
all norms are directed to some set of agents. agents to which norms are 
addressed are the addressees of norms. They are supposed to be moved by 
norms to act as these demand. norms have conditions of satisfaction. such 
conditions are what should be the case for the norms being satisfied. 
conditions of satisfaction are determined by two elements: the character 
and the content of the norm. There are three possible characters of a norm: 
obligation, prohibition and permission. Obligations are satisfied when what 
is required is the case. Prohibitions are satisfied when what is forbidden is 
not the case. In the case of permissions it is more difficult to individuate the 
conditions of satisfaction. according to one interpretation, these conditions 
consist in the compatibility of what is permitted with other requirements. 
According to another interpretation permissions are satisfied if other 
participants to the practice regulated by the norm leave the addressee of the 
permission free to perform the permitted act and refrain from criticizing 
her when she does what is permitted. The Content of norms is what norms 
require, prohibit or permit. It can be an action or a behavior or some state 
of affairs.20 when the content of a norm is not an action, addressees can 
conform to what norms demand only by acting or refraining to act in some 
specific way, i.e., by bringing it about that what is expressed by the content 
of the norm is the case. it is therefore appropriate to distinguish between 
the conditions of satisfaction of a norm and the way in which addressees of 
the norm bring something about to satisfy these conditions.21
norms have a constitutive aim, role or telos. They are supposed to possess 
an authoritative force and a motivational influence over addressees, 
moving and guiding them to satisfy their conditions of satisfaction, i.e., 
to act in conformity to what norms require, permit or forbid.22 The ways 
20  For a discussion of the notions introduced here see, for example, VonWright (1963).
21  On this point see footnote 16.
22  See VonWright (1963) p. 159, VonWright (1963) pp. 2-3 and 118-119. For similar considerations 
about the guiding nature of rules see Baker e Hacker (1985), pp. 259-260.
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in which norms are able to persuade their addressees to comply with 
them are different. agents can be motivated to follow norms by the fear 
of punishment, the desire to respect a common established convention, 
a self-commitment to the rules, the aversion to negative feelings such as 
shame, embarrassment and guilt, the criticism of other participants to a 
practice, the risk of exclusion from a practice, and so on.
Not only are norms supposed to have a guiding influence on agents’ 
intentional actions and behaviors, but they are supposed to have it in 
the appropriate way, as an effect of the agents’ recognition of the content 
and role of norms and the motivation caused by the influence of their 
normative force.23 This condition does not entail that addressees of norms 
are always motivated by norms, or even acknowledge norms and recognize 
them as involving normative force. norms can fail to motivate agents to 
act as they require. Or agents motivated by a norm and acting with the 
intention of doing what the norm requires can fail to fulfill the norm 
because of factors out of their control. norms are in place independently 
of their actual recognition, motivation and fulfillment on the part of their 
addressees. The mentioned motivational condition has to do with what 
norms in themselves are supposed to do, what their role is, and not with 
their success in moving the addressees to comply with them.
in order to better understand the structure of norms described above, 
let me consider a specific example: the positive law that obliges citizens 
to pay taxes. The norm has an obligatory character and its content is the 
action of paying taxes. The addressees of this law are citizens, a specific 
set of agents. The law is satisfied if and only if citizens pay taxes. The 
law is supposed to motivate citizens to pay taxes. law provides reasons 
for moving its addressees to comply with it. it does that by means of the 
praise of those who respect it, the justification of the reasons why they 
must respect it, and the threat of punishment for infractions. citizens are 
supposed to be moved by this law in the appropriate way, because they 
recognize the norm as such, feel its normative force and are moved by the 
reasons it gives them. This does not mean that addressees are always in 
the position to acknowledge and recognize this law as involving normative 
force, be motivated by it, and fulfil it. Sometimes this law fails to motivate 
citizens, who don’t pay taxes. or agents can also be motivated by the law 
and act with the intention of paying taxes, but for some cause out of their 
control fail to do so. The very same features individuated in this example 
23  The normative force is supposed to determine agent’s motivation for the right kind of 
reasons. on the appropriate ways in which norms are supposed to motivate their addressees see 
Glüer e Pagin (1999), p. 208. On the inappropriateness of deviant causal chains in the explanation 
of normative guidance see Railton (2006) and Schroeder (2008).
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can be found in every other type of norm.24
Values do not possess the ontological structure of norms described above. 
in values it is possible at most to identify a distinction between evaluative 
properties and descriptive conditions on which such properties supervene. 
The only analogy could be between descriptive conditions on which values 
supervene and conditions of satisfaction of norms. however, the analogies 
between the ontological structure of norms and values seem to end here, for 
there is nothing in values that can be compared to an addressee. while value 
properties can be conceived as properties standing in a binary relation with 
descriptive conditions on which they supervene, norms have more complex 
structures involving a set of addressees and conditions of satisfactions and 
are relative to different standards. furthermore, values are not supposed 
to motivate agents to act, at least not in the way norms do; and when values 
motivate action, they do so in a different way than norms. Values do not 
motivate by means of the exercise of an authoritative force over agents. rather, 
normally agents acknowledge values by perceiving or feeling the goodness of 
a thing, the ugliness of a face or the courage in an action. when values have an 
impact on agents’ motivation this commonly happens because of their effect on 
desires and emotions rather than from the recognized force of some authority.25
24  One may object that in this paper I do not consider a specific type of norms that seems not to 
possess the features described in this section, namely, constitutive norms. as glüer e Pagin (1999) well 
clarify, there seems to be at least two notions of constitutive norm in the literature. one notion was 
discussed by philosophers such as Midgley (1958), Searle (1969), Lewis (1983), and more recently Zelaniec 
(2010) and (2013). An example of constitutive rules in this sense is “A touchdown is scored when a player 
has possession of the ball in the opponents’ end zone while a play is in progress” (Searle1969, p. 34). 
According to this notion, constitutive rules are not deontic or evaluative standards but specifications 
akin to definitions of some aspect of a practice or activity; constitutive rules, contrary to regulative 
ones, do not mandate their performance or evaluate a certain condition, they merely state what certain 
actions count as. They have neither addressees nor conditions of satisfaction. They cannot be violated. 
They are not guiding insofar there is nothing that these norms require or assess (cfr. Glüer e Pagin 
(1999), pp. 217-219). They just determine a practice without playing any direct role in its normative 
regulation. another notion of constitutive norm has been discussed in more recent times (e.g., 
Williamson (2000), pp. 239-240, Wedgwood (2002)). According to this notion, constitutivity designates 
a relation of metaphysical or conceptual dependence of a thing from a certain property. a constitutive 
norm is such that some activity (or other type of entity) metaphysically or conceptually depends on that 
norm. constitutive norms in this latter sense, conceived as prescriptions or permissions that enter in 
the essential or conceptual definition of a thing, have the same ontological structure attributed to other 
norms in sections 1 and 2. In contrast, constitutive norms in the first sense have normative force on 
agents only derivatively, insofar they are associated to further regulative rules (Zelaniec (2010), p. 422). 
For this reason, I am reluctant to attribute to constitutive norms in the first sense a genuine normative 
nature. This is also why i do not discuss this type of norms in this paper. however i am aware that this 
latter consideration is debatable. different approaches to these issues are possible depending on how 
one conceives normativity.
25  in normal circumstances we have access to values by means of emotions and feelings. 
another way of access to values is testimony: i could know that a thing is evaluable for i’ve been 
told so. sometimes testimony provides us knowledge or belief that something is evaluable, and 
these cognitive attitudes in turn can motivate us to desire these values and to act in certain 
ways. in such cases, values motivate without having a direct impact on desires and emotions. 
Thanks to a reviewer for pointing this type of cases to my attention.
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although this may be challenged, it looks prima facie very plausible, 
almost platitudinous, that norms possess the properties attributed to 
them in the above section. in this section i argue that by assuming that 
norms, and only norms, essentially possess these properties, one can 
at least partially explain the plausibility of the traditional criteria of 
distinction between norms and values introduced in section 1.  
The considered properties of norms can explain at least some of the 
lexical differences between the two domains (1st criterion). The domain of 
normative terms is organized around the general notions of obligation, 
prohibition and permission because these are the three possible characters 
that every norm possesses. normative judgments can be reformulated in 
claims in the imperative mood because norms are essentially supposed 
to motivate agents to fulfill them. The imperative mood is particularly 
appropriate to convey the normative force required to move addressees to 
comply with norms. This is not the case for evaluative judgments that can 
eventually motivate agents to act, but are not essentially aimed at moving 
agents to realize the evaluated conditions.
on the one hand, values are strictly related to emotions. emotions are 
many, stand in a variety of different reciprocal relations and are either 
positive or negative. This explains why there is a great variety of values, 
all related to the determinable thick values of goodness and badness. on 
the other hand, norms have less complex relations than values for they 
are not supposed to motivate agents to act by inducing different types 
of emotions, but by exercising on agents an authoritative force that has 
similar characteristics in all norms (2nd criterion).
in normal circumstances, agents are receptive to values in a passive 
way. when directly recognized (i.e., when our acknowledgment of 
them is not mediated by testimony), values have an impact on agents’ 
motivation by the mediation of emotions. on the contrary, agents are 
supposed to be “forced” to act by norms, influenced by a recognized and 
accepted authoritative force. norms are more directly related to reasons 
and motivation insofar as they are essentially supposed to motivate 
their addressees to act as they require. This explains the 3rd criterion of 
distinction between values and norms.
The properties of norms considered above can provide an explanation 
of why normally normative judgments possess a logical form involving 
operators taking propositions or predicates while evaluative concepts 
figure in judgments in a predicative position (4th criterion). The reason is 
that norms possess a more complex structure that cannot be expressed 
by simple one-place predicates without resorting to contextual 
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implicatures. The assertion “answering emails is mandatory” is 
underspecified. It implies that answering is required of some addressee 
by some authority and according to some normative standard. nothing 
similar is the case for value ascriptions. asserting that a certain act is 
courageous may be vague, but such an assertion does not leave implied in 
the context any important feature of the evaluation.  
norms are supposed to motivate their addressees to realize certain 
conditions. addressees can bring about the realization of such conditions 
only by performing some specific set of actions. This explains why agents 
can comply with norms only by performing some action (6th criterion). This 
also explains the non-gradability of norms as opposed to the gradability 
of values (5th criterion). Performing an action may be, but normally is not, 
a matter of degrees. The non-gradability of norms is contrasted with the 
gradability of evaluative properties, which do not have the same relation 
with actions. rather, values have a closer relation with emotions. emotions 
come in degrees. This explains why values are gradable.
That addressees can comply with norms only by performing actions 
explains why norms are committed to specific principles, such as the 
ought-implies-can principle and the principle of parsimony, while values are 
not (7th criterion). norms are supposed to motivate their addressees to 
act in such a way as to comply with some normative demands. if an agent 
were not in the position of performing such actions – either because she 
cannot freely choose whether to conform with the norm or infringe it, 
or because what the norm requires is something necessary, impossible, 
or not dependent on her voluntary control – then the norm would be 
absurd, insofar as its authority would irrationally issue an unsatisfiable 
demand asking for actions that are not under the ken of the addressee’s 
agency. Values are not supposed to motivate agents to perform certain 
actions. This explains why they are not bound by these constraints.  
agents can be held responsible and blamed for violations of norms (8th 
criterion). This is because addressees who recognize and accept a norm 
are supposed to try to comply with it, and are held responsible for this. 
while involuntary infractions are excusable, intentional infractions 
are considered wrongdoings deserving of punishment and blame. The 
categories of responsibility and blamability do not apply to subjects 
that are responsive to values, since values are not such that agents are 
supposed to be guided by them to act in a certain way.
Values supervene on descriptive properties. whether a similar relation 
of supervenience obtains between norms and their conditions of 
satisfaction is a debated matter (9th criterion). whatever be the truth 
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about this matter, i think that the complex ontological structure 
of norms described in the previous section can explain at least the 
intuition of non-supervenience of norms on descriptive conditions. since 
norms involve complex relations amongst several properties (addressees, 
conditions of satisfactions, normative standards,...), it would not do 
justice to the complexity of norms to describe norms as simple binary 
supervenience relations between normative properties and conditions of 
satisfaction. such a description would be necessarily incomplete, leaving 
implicit a number of important features of norms.  
in this article i argued that by assuming that norms but not values 
essentially possess a specific set of properties, we can better appreciate 
the distinction between the two domains and we can provide an 
explanation of the plausibility of the criteria traditionally used by 
philosophers to track the distinction. my considerations could have 
consequences for other issues concerning the relation between the 
two normative domains, such as whether norms are reducible to, or 
dependent on values or vice versa, and whether norms, values, or both 
can be reducible to descriptive features or are irreducibly normative. 
however, these further developments are beyond the scope of the 
present work.
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